Unemployment, Wage Push and the Labour Cost Competitiveness of Regions - The Case of Hungary, 1986-1996 by Gabor Kertesi & Janos Kollo
Unemployment, Wage Push and the Labour
Cost Competitiveness of Regions
– The Case of Hungary, 1986–1996
GÁBOR KERTESI and JÁNOS KÖLLÕ
Budapest Working Papers on the Labour Market
BWP. 1999/5
June 1999Budapest Working Papers No.1999/5
Labour Research Department, Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Department of Human Resources, Budapest University of Economics
Unemployment, Wage Push and the Labour Cost Competitiveness
of Regions – The Case of Hungary, 1986–1996
Authors: Gábor KERTESI,  senior research fellow of Labour Research
Department, Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
Address: Budaörsi út 45. Budapest, H–1112 Hungary. Phone: (36-1)
309-2655  Fax: (36-1) 319-3136  E-mail address: kertesi@econ.core.hu
János KÖLLÕ, senior research fellow of Labour Research Depart-
ment, Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences; Fellow
at William Davidson Institute, University of Michigan Business School,
Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA. Address: Budaörsi út 45. Budapest, H–1112
Hungary. Phone: (36-1) 309-2654  Fax: (36-1) 319-3151  E-mail address:
kollo@econ.core.hu
Published by the Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
Budapest, 1999.
With financial support from  the  Hungarian  Economic  Foundation
and the Foundation for Job CreationUNEMPLOYMENT, WAGE PUSH AND THE LABOUR COST
COMPETITIVENESS OF REGIONS
– THE CASE OF HUNGARY, 1986–1996
GÁBOR  KERTESI and JÁNOS  KÖLLÕ
The paper analyses regional relative wages using individual and firm-
level data from Hungary 1986-96. In regions hit hard by the transition
shock labour costs fell substantially; the estimated elasticities of
wages with respect to regional unemployment were in a range typical
of mature market economies already in 1992-93. In later stages of the
transition the hard-hit rural regions lost a large part of their cost
advantage vis-à-vis Budapest and the central agglomeration for
reasons including spatial diseconomies and falling search activity
among the registered unemployed. The paper argues that the time
path observed in Hungary (a U-curve of relative labour costs in
crisis-hit regions) may prevail in other economies calling the attention
to the limits of wage flexibility as a cure to persistent regional crises.
1. INTRODUCTION
In only three years following the collapse of state socialism unemployment
rose from close-to-zero to two-digit levels in Hungary.
1 The regional
dispersion behind the aggregate rate was considerable from the beginning.
When registered unemployment reached its highest level in March 1993
(12.9%) the rates of the 170 labour office districts ranged between 4% and
34%. Local unemployment exceeded 40% in 174 municipalities and 60%
in 22 settlements. In five villages predictably more than 80% of the active
                                                
1 This research was undertaken with support from the European Union's Phare-ACE
Program P96-6230-R. Data collection was also supported by OTKA 94-018218. The
authors thank the National Labour Centre and the Central Statistical Office, Budapest,
for access to data sets, and are grateful to Charles Brown, Péter Galasi, Gábor Kézdi,
Gábor Kõrösi and Patrick Puhani for comments on earlier versions.2
population was out of work.
2 Even a transitory shock of this magnitude
could have caused severe difficulties for a society grown up in an age of
full employment. The regional shocks, however, had a lasting effect: the
social deprivation caused by the long-term lack of jobs, especially in the
north-eastern villages, is manifest and calls for a better understanding and
promotion of the possible equilibrating mechanisms.
The paper would like to contribute to this by presenting evidence on the
wage push of unemployment and other factors affecting regional relative
labour costs. The importance of wage adjustment in contemporary Hungary
is underlined by at least three facts. First, the supply side of the market
works slowly: the studies of migration and commuting in this and other
CEE countries by  Erbenova (1995),  Kertesi (1997),  Köllõ (1997) or
Günther (1999) suggest that although spatial mobility is non-negligible,
and does respond to changes in the economic environment, it can hardly be
regarded as an efficient equilibrating mechanism under the given
institutional conditions, costs and traditions. (Unlike in the US as discussed
in Blanchard and Katz 1992). Second, taking other things equal, transport
cost considerations and external economies favour the further concentration
of economic activity in the capital areas and its relocation to the low-
unemployment, high-income western border districts. ( Gorzelak 1996,
Fazekas  and  Ozsvald 1998). Third, government-financed infrastructure
investment is also biased for the main transport routes and primate
agglomerations. (EC 1992, 1994, 1996). Arguably, without lower relative
labour costs there is little hope for the catching-up of hard-hit regions in the
foreseeable future.
Since unemployment reduces the cost of labour  per se by making
recruitment and screening easier relative wages should not necessarily fall
in order to attract investors. The motivation to create jobs is nonetheless
stronger if these advantages are combined with some easy-to-observe and
immediate gains from lower pecuniary compensation. In the paper we look
at potential employer’s gains of this sort following the sequence below.
Section 2 introduces the research site, derives the empirical questions from
a simple model of wage bargaining and discusses data issues. In Section 3
                                                
2 Szemere, Csenyéte, Kisrécse, Rakaca and Pamlény.The local rates compare the
number of registered unemployed to the active population in 1990. Since outward
migration and exit from the labour force are positively correlated with past and present
unemployment we probably underestimate the degree of regional unemployment rate
differentials.3
the adjustment of wages to  registered  unemployment is analyzed with
repeated cross-section regressions using individual and firm-level data
from 1986-96. This is followed by an examination of the (seemingly)
region-specific evolutions, that is, the part of the wage change that is
unexplained by the registered unemployment rate differentials and other
observed factors. It will be shown in Section 4 that these evolutions were
consistent with changes in search unemployment.  Section 5  investigates
whether the flexible adjustment of wages was followed by regional
convergence until 1996 and Section 6 concludes.
2. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND ANALYTICAL
FRAMEWORK
2.1. Wage setting
Hungary abolished central planning in 1968 and controlled wages by
means of taxes until 1993. In the post-1968 regime firms were free to set
wages within broad limits suggested (rather than prescribed) for
occupational categories. Taxes were levied on the wage  increment with
rates depending on the ratio of wage change to a reference indicator. The
details of the tax system changed rather frequently but in the typical setting
the tax was a function of the ratio of wage bill growth to value added
growth. The tax was prohibitive with extremely high marginal rates. The
rules of taxation were gradually relaxed in the last years of state socialism:
in several years between 1985 and 1990 firms were allowed to chose
between different tax regimes and the emerging private firms were exempt
of the wage tax from the onset. In 1992 wage control was replaced with a
rather unique ‘tax game’ and in 1993 the restrictions on enterprise wage
setting were completely abolished.
3
In parallel, an institutional framework was built for collective bargaining of
a western fashion with the national-level ‘Council of the Reconciliation of
                                                
3 In 1992 the tax to be paid by a firm depended on the rate of growth of its average wage
(dw) relative to wage inflation in the economy (dW). The rules of the game were set
by a national-level tripartite body in the following way. In case of dw<15 per cent or
dw>15 and dW<15 the wage increment was tax-free. In case of dw>15 and dW>15 the
firm faced a punitive tax. The agreement was conditioned on a certain range of
anticipated price inflation E(dp). The parties agreed to renegotiate the rules in case of
dW>15 and dp>>E(dp).4
Interests’ (CRI) on the top, industrial agreements at the intermediate level
and enterprise-level negotiations at the bottom. Starting from 1992 a
proposed range of average wage increase was published by the CRI at the
beginning of each year except in 1995 when the negotiations failed. In
principle the CRI-level talks should have been followed by industrial
negotiations but soon after its establishment the sectoral level of bargaining
started to lose importance. The number of registered intermediate-level
agreements fell from 24 to 12 in 1992-1996 and the proportion of workers
covered by them dropped from 41% to only 12%. (MoL 1998).
The minimum wage, negotiated at the national level, seems to enter the
wage setting process in an indirect way via public sector wages or social
benefits based on some multiple of the statutory minimum. There is wide
agreement that a direct effect on enterprise behaviour is unlikely under the
current settings where the minimum wage amounts to less than 1/3 of the
average wage and its net value falls short of the subsistence income level
by 40%. This general belief is supported by the fact that the share of
workers paid at or below the statutory minimum (only 2% in 1995) is
substantially lower than anywhere in Western Europe. (Koltay 1996, ILO
1997).
These pieces of information suggest that if workers and managers enter
negotiations over wages they predominantly do so at the enterprise level,
and they are typically not constrained by ceilings or floors determined by
sectoral agreements or legislation. The negotiations are often informal
since only 60% of the labour force (including public sector employees) are
unionized according to the probably inflated figures given by the union
federations themselves. (ILO 1998). Nevertheless, the number of registered
firm-level agreements is also increasing (312 in 1992 and 594 in 1996).
The proportion of workers covered by formal firm-level agreements was
surprisingly low even so (31.6% in 1996 as reported in MoL 1998).
While there is little doubt that bargaining usually takes place at the
enterprise level, often informally, much less is known about what is
covered by the agreements besides wages. In particular, it is unclear
whether workers and managers typically bargain over wages or both wages
and employment. Since the agreements on employment are usually
achieved informally – via safety regulations, manning standards or
worktime restrictions – it would be difficult to make clear statements on the
basis of the available scarce evidence. We think, nevertheless, that
assuming ‘employment-aware’ unions keen about their jobless members5
would be at odds with common experience. Recall unemployment, a
typical symptom of employment-aware bargaining, is relatively scarce in
Hungary outside some seasonal industries and agriculture. (Köllõ and Nagy
1996). Wage moderation, in exchange of jobs for the unemployed union
members, fails to come up as an issue in industrial disputes. As far as
resistance to extended worktime is concerned it is instructive to quote a
survey carried out by the AmCham (Martin 1998): when foreign investors
were asked about their motives to come to Hungary they ranked third (out
of 36 items) that working time can be flexibly set at the enterprise level.
Indeed, foreign firms regularly recall their workers for overtime and
weekend shifts without hard resistance on the part of worker
representatives. We think therefore that the assumption of unions primarily
concerned with wages and the job stability of insiders – as opposed to
unions maximizing the welfare of a fixed membership – is highly justified
in the Hungarian case.
Assuming, accordingly, that that utility-maximizing employees and profit-
maximizing employers bargain over wages, but employment is set
unilaterally by the firm, the process can be described as a Nash-bargain.
4
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4 This model is a variant of Blanchflower and Oswald (1995, pp. 84-85). Alternatively,
the unemployment-wage relationship could be analyzed following the theory of
efficiency wages ( Shapiro and  Stiglitz 1984) or the theorem of simultaneous
employment and wage bargaining (McDonald and Solow 1982).6
Using the Taylor formula:
(3)                                u w u w w w u w ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
* * » + - ¢
equation (2) can be re-written:
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In case workers have no bargaining power (b =0 implying  a = 0) the
employer sets the wage at the reservation level. If workers have their own
way (bﬁ1 or aﬁ ¥), they fully appropriate the firm’s revenue (net of
reservation profit) in the form of wages:
(6)                               lim
*
aﬁ =
0w w   and   lim
*
a p
ﬁ¥ = - w y  .
The reservation levels of wages and profits are unobservable, so equation
(5) can not be directly estimated, but we can presume that reservation
wages vary with a number of observable individual attributes like gender,
experience or education,  and environmental characteristics. The latter can
be divided to local diseconomies that should be compensated (such as the
high transport costs and expensive dwellings of metropolitan areas) and to
factors shaping the ‘cost of disagreement’. If wage bargaining fails workers
face a shorter or longer period of unemployment, at least a temporary
earnings loss because of the loss of seniority, or even a permanent wage cut
if the job openings are typically found in some low-wage sectors. Denoting
the variables which shape the ‘cost of disagreement’ with  D, the other
relevant regional characteristics with R and human capital variables with H
we can specify a reservation wage function:7
(7) w* = a1 + a’2 D + a’3R + a’4H + e1.
Reservation profits may vary with industry, ownership, or other variables
constituting vector z:
(8)                                   p e
* = + ¢ + b 1 2 b z 2  .
Substituting (7) and (8) for w* and  p* in equation (5) we come to a
Mincer-type earnings function:
(9) w = a + b’D  + f’R + cy + d’H + e’z + e
In order to make (9) estimable we need to approximate  D with some
observable variables. Customarily, regional unemployment rates are used at
this aim but this choice poses difficult questions in a period when the
composition of unemployment is changing dramatically and the rules of
unemployment assistance are modified year by year. To explicate this
problem, and justify the procedure we follow during the analysis, a brief
section is devoted to the changing patterns of unemployment and of related
institutions.
2.2. The patterns of unemployment
Unemployment was not statistically observed, and was presumably very
low indeed, in Hungary prior to 1985-86 when a last attempt to ‘speed up’
the socialist economy failed. The final years of the communist rule brought
about a marked decline of labour demand (Kõrösi 1998) motivating the
introduction of retraining benefits and redemployment allowance of limited
availability already in 1987. Even so the first reliable statistical
observations indicated a mere 1.2 % rate of registered unemployment at the
end of 1990.
During the transition registered unemployment rose sharply until 1993 and
was declining since then. The composition of the stock by duration and
access to financial assistance changed considerably as shown by a most
simple overview in Table 1.
5
                                                
5 On the duration of unemployment, assistance and their interactions in Hungary see
particularly Micklewright and Nagy (1993, 1994).8
Table 1











1986 n.a. n.a. n.a. no ..
1987 0.1 n.a. n.a. limited ..
1988 0.2 n.a. n.a. limited ..
1989 0.3 n.a. n.a. limited ..
1990 0.4 n.a. n.a. limited ..
1991 1.9 n.a. n.a. max 24 mo no
1992 7.8 9.4 16.6 max 18 mo no
1993 13.2 11.9 30.3 max 12 mo yes
1994 11.4 10.7 42.0 max 12 mo yes
1995 11.1 10.2 45.9 max 12 mo yes
1996 10.7 9.9 53.7 max 12 mo yes
Notes: Registry figures: January 1. (For 1987-89: estimates by the CSO). LFS figures:
first quarter. LTU stands for workers having lost their jobs for more than one year.
Source: CSO (1998). Benefits: In 1987-90 benefits were provided for workers affected
by mass layoffs. Availability was not guaranteed by law. In 1991-96 UI was earnings-
related, capped and had a fixed minimum amount. SB was means-tested, flat-rate and
open-ended.
The registry-based and the ILO/OECD measures of unemployment were
fairly close to each other on the national level until 1996 but the regional
dispersion of search activity has always been substantial as will be
discussed later.
As suggested by the table, accounting for the heterogeneity of the
unemployment stock with respect to job search, spell duration and financial
status would be vital (even more than in established market economies) but
a precise decomposition is practically infeasible. Unfortunately, the Labour
Force Survey was started only in 1992 and is only representative for large
territorial units. Further problems would arise if we wanted to analyze how
the LTU share or the ratio of UI or SB recipients affect wages. These
variables are observed at lower levels of aggregation but their values
depend on the historical time path of unemployment and are extremely
strongly correlated.
Since wages are expected to respond to search unemployment, but we can
not observe the latter at an appropriate level of disaggregation, an
admittedly second-best indirect way was chosen for the forthcoming9
empirical analysis. We shall start with registered unemployment rates
measured on the level of 170 labour office districts as a proxy of D while R
will be represented by a vector of region dummies.
(10) w = a + b’u + + f’R + cy + d’H + e’Z + e
In interpreting the results from equation (10) it should be kept in mind that
the f parameters measure regional effects holding registered unemployment
constant. In the districts where search unemployment is low relative to
registry unemployment they are expected to be higher, and vice versa.
Fortunately, on the level of the spatial units and settlement types
distinguished by  R both the registry and the LFS-based measures are
available after 1992 so we can relate the movements in the f parameters to
changes in the search intensity of the non-employed.
It should be added that the rationale of ‘holding registered unemployment
constant’ is not purely technical. Passive registered unemployment may not
be highly important from the point of view of wage moderation but it is
still a meaningful indicator showing the gravity of the disease to be cured
perhaps more accurately than does the restrictive ILO/OECD measure.
 2.3. Data
We use data from the National Labour Centre’s Wage Survey (WS) for
estimating cross-section OLS regressions for 1986, 1989 and 1992-1996.
(No data are available for 1987-88 and 1990-91). The WS waves cover
random samples of 3-12 thousand firms employing more than 20 workers
(10 workers in 1995-96) and 10% random samples of their employees. The
number of individual observations exceeds 85,000 in each year.
A summary of sample properties, variables and weighting is given in App.
1. At this point only the key variables will be introduced briefly.
Unemployment was assumed to be zero in 1986 and was measured on the
level of 170 labour office districts later. (For 1989 we used the first
available disaggregated observation from 1990.) The rates compare the
number of registered unemployed to the active population of 1990. A
justification for this second-best solution and an accounting of the resulting
bias is given in Ábrahám and Kertesi (1997). The region dummies stand for
5 macro-regions (central, north-western, north-eastern, south-western,
south-eastern) and 3 settlement types (county capitals, other towns,
villages) plus Budapest. Productivity was measured on the firm level with
sales net of material cost per worker.10
The equations are first estimated for the full sample using the specification
of equation (10).  Table A1 presents the coefficients and test statistics
except those of the 27 industry dummies. For an overview of how industry
rents were changing see Fig. A1. The impact of demographic and human
capital variables is discussed in detail  Kertesi and Köllõ (1999). Table A1
calls the attention to growing wage differentials by firm size and ownership
while Fig. A1 hints at a leveling off of labour costs within manufacturing;
falling wages in the tertiary sector; increasing industry rents in some
extraction industries, the energy sector, railways and public transport.
These developments would certainly deserve closer investigation but in this
paper we only interpret the results directly relevant for the issue of regional
relative labour costs.
Allowing for the possibility that free wage bargaining started earlier in
small firms, exempt of regulations, another pooled model was estimated
with unemployment and firm size interacted. (The main results presented in
Table 2 ). We also estimated the equations for 12 occupations using a
simplified functional form and restricting the analysis to 1995. (Table A2).
The results from the WS samples are confronted with data on wage
recovery among the unemployed ( Table 3 ). After evaluating the link
between wages and unemployment in these models we turn to the
inspection of the ‘pure’ region effects (f) and possible explanation of their
time-path.
3. WAGES AND REGISTERED UNEMPLOYMENT
As Hungary moved towards free enterprise-level wage bargaining
individual earnings became increasingly responsive to local unemployment
and the link between wages and productivity strengthened markedly.
Between 1986 and 1996 the productivity-elasticity of the wage grew from
6% to 20% with only minor fluctuations. After similarly marked rise the
unemployment-elasticity of earnings reached -10% a value interpreted by
Blachflower and Oswald (1994) as the typical estimate in mature market
economies. (Fig. 1 based on Table A1)11
Fig. 1
The elasticities of individual earnings with respect to firm-level
productivity and registered regional unemployment in 1986-96
Fig 2.
Labour cost differentials implied by unemployment 1989-96
(Regions with median unemployment = 100)
The wage gaps implied by the observed unemployment rate differentials
holding other wage determinants constant are displayed on Fig. 2. Starting
from a presumed zero effect in 1986 the implied gap between the best and
the worst regions widened from about 7% in 1989 to 25% in 1996.12
The predicted differentials relate to labour costs, that is, wage differentials
between firms of identical productivity. Estimating the wage equations
without the productivity term would yield stronger unemployment effects
(coefficients higher in absolute value by about 0.02 throughout 1992-96). If
the unemployment rates were  measured at the level of the 20 counties
rather than the 170 labour office districts the models would yield lower
elasticities. In 1995, for instance, the estimate would be -0.075 as opposed
to -0. 091.
Compared to similar results from other transition countries the Hungarian
estimates hint at a relatively high degree of wage flexibility. Using data
from 1996 Munich, Svejnar and Terrell (1999) estimate an elasticity of -
0.050 for Czech men and -0.078 for women. Their equations relate to all
wage earners (including budget sector employees and the self-employed)
and are controlled for education, experience, one digit industry, firm size,
ownership, and a dummy for Prague.
6 In order to produce roughly
comparable results in Hungary 1996 we extended the analysis to public
sector employees and estimated the equations separately for men and
women using the same controls as the Munich et al. study. The estimates in
this case were -0.118 for men and -0.092 for women. For the Polish private
sector, 1995, Puhani (1997) estimates earnings functions controlled for
education, experience, job grade, one-digit industry, four region dummies,
marital status, children, disability and previous unemployment experience –
with the voivodship unemployment rate entered in per cent – and gets
parameters of -0.008 for men and -0.003 for women. A similar
specification estimated for the Hungarian private sector 1995 (without the
family-level and career-related variables) yields -0.014 for men as well as
for women.
The unemployment elasticity of the wage increased faster in smaller firms.
(Table 2) This is consistent with the expectation that being exempt of wage
taxation, free of legal restrictions and informal pressures – and subject to
harder competition – the privately owned small firms had the motivation
and the authority to adjust their wages to local unemployment already in
the early stages of the transition. Following the liberalization of wage
setting in 1993 the differences between smaller and larger firms, in this
respect, gradually disappeared.
                                                
6 Two other variables control for recall bias.13
Table 2
The elasticities of  individual earnings with respect to
registered unemployment at firms of different size
Firm size 1986 1989 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Small (L=30) .. -2.9 -9.5 -11.5 -10.7 -10.1 -9.3
Medium (L=300) .. -2.1 -7.4 -7.8 -8.7 -9.4 -10.5
Large (L=1000) .. -1.7 -6.3 -5.8 -7.6 -9.0 -11.2
Calculated by evaluating the marginal effect of unemployment on the wage at the given
firm size. The estimated equations deviate from (10) in that firm size (L) was measured
continuously and was interacted with unemployment by including ln(L), ln(u) and
ln(L)￿ln(u) on the right-hand side.
We do not study structural breaks by age groups or genders because it
seems difficult to interpret the group-level estimates ( dw
j/w)/(du/u)
showing the response of wages in group j to variations in the  aggregate
regional unemployment rate. We nevertheless tested the stability of the  b
parameter by estimating earnings functions for all occupations where the
number of observations exceeded 3,000. In the case of the largest industry-
specific occupational groups (metal and light industrial manual workers)
the models were also estimated for those employed in the engineering and
textiles industries, respectively. In order to reduce the number of
explanatory variables continuos schooling and firm size variables were
entered. The industry dummies were dropped and R was represented only
with the settlement size dummies. Table A2 presents the results for 1995, a
year when we already expect similar parameters centered around -9.1 %,
the estimate for the pooled sample. Indeed, the coefficients fall close to this
value (in ten out of twelve cases they are between -8.5 % and -11 %) with
the notable exception of office clerks (-16.3 %). Arguably, the extreme
value in this case indicates a high degree of substitutability and also reflects
compositional bias stemming from the fact that the office clerks do rather
different jobs in metropolitan areas, where company headquarters are
located, and in small villages hit by high unemployment.
The results encourage the proposition that in about five years following the
collapse of state socialism a statistically significant link was established
between unemployment and wages, with sign and magnitude similar to
those observed in fully-fledged market economies. Nevertheless, before
accepting that wages behave ‘as they should in a market-based system’ we
have to confront the basic findings with alternative interpretations and
address further factors shaping regional relative wages.14
3.2. Registered unemployment and wage recovery - A digression
In bargaining models the causation leads from high unemployment to low
pay and we interpret the results from the earnings functions accordingly. In
principle, the underlying chain of events can be different: following a
demand shock some employees, those with high reservation wages, do no
accept the pay cuts taken by their fellow workers and quit to look for better
jobs or register for benefits without searching. The outcome of this scenario
is observationally equivalent with the outcome derivable from a bargaining
framework: earnings are lower and registry unemployment is higher where
the shock had been stronger. In this presentation the  threat of
unemployment is the cause, lower pay is an intermediate effect and high
registered unemployment (combined with not necessarily high search
unemployment) is the final result.
The evidence discussed later in the paper will leave no doubt that there is
an element of truth in this argumentation but it would predictably fail as a
general explanation. The available scarce evidence suggests that the
reservation wages of the registered unemployed are not rigid, as assumed in
the above-told scenario, but fall with the rate of registered unemployment.
To find support for this proposition we estimate wage change regressions
for reemployed workers using a part of a sample analyzed in detail in Köllõ
and Nagy (1996). In that paper it was argued that workers returning to
employment in high-unemployment regions within 6 months do so at the
cost of additional wage cut. In the case of long spells the paper found no
significant link between local unemployment and wage recovery. We
reestimate the equations distinguishing between two types of long spells
and get significant results for a part of the long-term unemployed.
The data refer to 6931 previously displaced workers leaving insured
unemployment for a job in April 1994. (Temporary layoff spells are
excluded). All workers whose benefit payment was terminated for the
reason of finding employment in this period were interviewed by officers in
charge of benefit administration. The pre-unemployment earnings figure
considered (w
0) is average gross monthly earnings in the four, full calendar
quarters preceding registration, as registered in the UI records. Post-
unemployment gross monthly earnings (w
1) are expected ones in the first
months following reemployment, as reported by the interviewed workers.
Earnings gains and losses are adjusted for wage inflation between the date15
of registration and exit (both w
0 and w
1 are expressed in 1994 March
values). Unemployment was measured as in this paper.
The completed long spells are divided into two categories. First the
probability is estimated that a worker is observed after a long as opposed to
a short spell. The estimation is made with binary probit using gender,
education, experience, tenure, location, industry and firm size of origin as
predictors. Type A long spells are those with a predicted probability Prob
(spell length > 6 months) > 0.5 and Type B spells are those where P<0.5.
Simply stating, Type A spells lasted long and it was expected on the basis
of the worker’s attributes. Type B spells lasted long despite favorable
personal attributes (ones which generally imply a short spell). The intention
to make this distinction stems from the conjecture that some Type B spells
may have lasted long for reasons other than the lack of adequate job offers.
7
The wage change regressions are presented in Table 3 for short spells and
Type A and Type B long spells.
The estimated impact of the local unemployment rate on real wage change
is presented in Table 3. The predictions show the percentage change of the
real wage of a male worker with primary education, 5 years of tenure; full
time non-managerial job before and after unemployment; no change in
sector, occupation, firm size and distance of travel; completed
unemployment duration of 12 months (long spells) and 3 months (short
spells) respectively; at 10 % and 20 % rates of regional unemployment.
The results reinforce that workers returning to employment after a short
spell do so at the expense of larger wage cuts in high-unemployment
regions. This, in fact, also holds for the majority of long spells if we
control, roughly as we do, for waiting behavior. In the case of Type B long
spells (cases where we would normally expect a short rather than a long
spell) the coefficient is positive and only significant at the 10% level. We
observe mean earnings gain from unemployment and a low seniority-age
ratio that hints at highly mobile workers in this group.
                                                
7 Obviously, this procedure has nothing to do with duration analysis. The probits simply
want to distinguish between people of similar personal characteristics but different
completed spell lengths. We also note here that the standard selectivity-bias corrected
wage change regressions (with probit for exit during the month under examination)
indicated no self-selection bias in this sample (op.cit. p 286).16
Table 3
Results on  workers leaving the UI register for a job in April 1994
OLS estimation of  ln(w
1/w
0) = b1X + b2ln(u) + e  by groups*
Spell length: Type A Type B
Actual Short Short Long Long
Expected Short Long Long Short
Impact on the rate of wage
change of the local registered
unemployment rate









Nobs: 2508 1331 1932 1160
Predicted wage change (%)
(see the text)
at u = 10% -5.5 -13.5 -1.4 +4.7
at u = 20 % -8.4 -18.3 -4.3 +8.2
Memo items:
Mean real wage change (%) +0.7 -3.3 -9.9 +2.3
Average age 36.3 34.6 36.3 34.3
Tenure in last job (years) 1.5 7.9 9.8 2.5
*The estimated equations are identical with those presented in Köllõ and Nagy (1996,
289) except for taking log of the unemployment rate and making distinction between
four rather than two groups of job losers. The X controls include gender, experience,
tenure in last job, spell duration, education, change of travel time, change of
worktime, change of job grade, change in industry-specific wage returns associated
with inter-industry shifts, change of firm size, ownership of the new employer.
At least in the case of the first and the third groups the estimated impacts
are significant and question the assumption of wage rigidity on the part of
the registered unemployed. In fact, the larger wage cuts accepted by many
job seekers under the pressure of poor job prospects may have contributed
to the fall of wages in the depressed areas.
4. ”REGIONAL” WAGE EFFECTS
As was previously emphasized the settlement-size and region dummies of
our models are expected to capture agglomeration and spatial effects
holding registered unemployment constant. We now turn to the study of
these effects using  Fig.3. The left panels display the time paths of the  f
parameters as defined in equation (10). The right panels show the
coefficients of the region dummies in models estimated without the
productivity variable.17
Fig.3.
‘Pure’ regional differentials in 1986-96
The coefficients of region dummies in models estimated
with and without the productivity term
The reference categories are towns and the south-eastern region, respectively
A) Differences between urban and rural areas
Labour cost     Earnings
B) Spatial differences
Labour cost     Earnings
Starting with cost differentials by settlement size we observe the widening
of the cost gap between rural and urban areas before 1992, followed by a
substantial fall of labour costs in Budapest and a minor decrease in county18
capitals. By 1996 the differentials between Budapest, the county capitals
and smaller towns virtually disappeared while the gap between towns and
villages was stabilized at a magnitude of about 5%.  The bottom left panel
tells a similar story with respect to spatial differentials: following 1992 the
cost of labour started to fall in the centrally located regions. A slight
decrease could be observed in all regions relative to the (south-eastern)
reference category. By 1996 the ‘pure’ spatial differentials between the
western, eastern and southern parts of the country became statistically
insignificant and those between the central agglomeration and other regions
shrank to a fraction of the 1992 level.
We only make a brief comment, without providing empirical support, on
developments prior to 1992. The charts depict the widening of the urban-
rural wage gap in this period and we believe it might be explained, in the
spirit of Paul Krugman’s ‘new economic geography’, with the growing
relative costs of living in urban areas. A substantial increase of transport
costs might be mentioned as one of the important underlying developments.
The privatization of the council flats (for the tenants) may have further
increased the relative expenses since it virtually eliminated the rental
housing sector and raised the pecuniary cost of entry to metropolitan areas.
The substantial tightening of the cost gap between urban and rural areas –
as well as between central and peripheral regions – after 1992 seems more
difficult to understand at first sight.
8 Compensating wage differentials must
have changed in favour of the primate agglomeration in this period because
public transport costs kept on rising, real estate prices continued to
differentiate, and pollution and congestion grew dramatically. Arguably, at
least two factors may have worked against the upwards wage pressures:
agglomeration economies on the one hand and the volume of search (at a
given rate of registered unemployment) on the other. The forthcoming
sections discuss these potentially important factors and briefly discuss
some other mechanisms of similar impact.
4.1. Agglomeration effects
Besides their high purchasing power, sizable markets, accessibility, high
schooling levels and good infrastructure Budapest and its agglomeration
offer a wide selection of ‘goods’ producing external economies such as
direct link with the political and financial decision-makers, spillover effects
                                                
8 Analyzing earnings functions for Poland Puhani (1997) also found that the difference
between large cities and smaller towns or villages decreased between 1992 and 1995.19
due to high firm density (twice as high as the national average),
cooperation with universities, and so on. In 1994 Budapest inhabited less
than 20% of Hungary’s population but produced 34.5% of its GDP,
concentrated 60.8% of the public sector employees, 49.7% of the financial
sector workers, 43.5% of the university students, 57.5% of the joint
ventures and 75.4% of the R+D expenditures as shown by  Fazekas and
Ozsvald (1998).
We test the existence of external economies in the central parts of the
country by comparing spatial differences in terms of wages versus labour
costs (wages controlled for productivity). Reestimating equation (10)
without the productivity variable yields the regression-adjusted earnings
differentials displayed on the right-hand side panels of Fig. 3.
It is apparent from the comparison of the right and left panels that a large
part of the fall in labour costs in the primate agglomeration stemmed from a
rise in productivity. Regression-adjusted labour costs fell by about 10 % in
Budapest between 1992 and 1996 but earnings fell only by 5%. The
respective magnitudes for the central agglomeration were 5% versus 2%.
Productivity shrank slightly in villages relative to urban areas while wages
and labour cost moved in tandem in regions other than the primate
agglomeration. Since the firms’ industrial affiliation, capital-labour ratio
and some other key characteristics are held constant it seems justified to
attribute the observed productivity trends to location.
The changes in productivity thus explain a part of the evolution of regional
relative labour costs but only a part because  earnings also declined in
Budapest and central Hungary relative to other regions, and in county
capitals relative to smaller settlements. A possible reason is that holding
registered unemployment constant search unemployment grew in larger
towns and Central Hungary relative to the peripheries.
4.2.  Spatial differences in job search
The Labour Force Survey provides information on both registered and
search unemployment, the latter defined on the basis of the standard
ILO/OECD criteria. Drawing the data from the first quarters of 1993-96 we
compare the number of active job seekers to the registered unemployed.
We deviate from the practice of the Central Statistical Office in that we
restrict the attention to people of working age (15-55/60) and exclude
students and mothers on maternity aid. The justification for comparing20
registry and search unemployment this way is given by the fact that the
members of the excluded groups are seldom registered as unemployed.
9
We calculate the ratio of ILO to registry unemployment in Budapest,
county capitals, towns and villages on the one hand, and in the five
geographical areas on the other. Then, following the logic of the wage
regressions, we compare these ratios to those of the reference categories
(towns and the South-East). Denoting the reference categories with ref and










The ratio of ILO/OECD to registry unemployment by regions 1993-96
Calculated from the LFS, Q1 of each year. Reference regions = 100
It is easy to check on the left panel, where settlement types are compared,
that throughout the observed period search unemployment (relative to
registered unemployment) was substantially higher in Budapest and the
county capitals than in smaller towns and villages. The position of the
county capitals improved considerably in 1995-96. Budapest also had
higher relative search intensity in 1996 than in 1993 or 1994 though we
                                                
9 A part of the deviation between the two measures of joblessness stems from the
application of a broader base in the case of the ILO/OECD rate.
10 We note that though the LFS was started in 1992 we could not make similar
calculations for that year because some of the concepts were defined  differently.21
observe a temporary fall in 1995. The right panel suggests that the spatial
differences in search intensity were also considerable, with Budapest on the
top and the crisis-hit South-East and North-East at the bottom. The
differentials were fairly stable in 1993-96 except in the South-East where
search intensity fell. Since the latter was chosen as the reference category
the S indicators were ascending over time everywhere.
These data suggest that the fall in the f parameters estimated for Budapest
and the 19 county capitals in (10) can be partly explained by a widening
gap in search intensity between them and smaller settlements – the change
was in fact consistent with the assumption that stronger competition for
jobs restrains wages. It is also worth noting that the spatial differentials in
ILO/OECD unemployment are smaller than the differentials in the
registered rate therefore our wage equations underestimate the
responsiveness of earnings to the the number of job seekers. The ‘true’
unemployment elasticities of wages may have been well below -10% in
1995-96.
4.3.  Other mechanisms
This section discusses some ‘disturbances’ complicating the relation
between local unemployment and local wage push. First, the competition
for private sector jobs can be stronger or weaker, at a given volume of
search unemployment, depending on the attractiveness of private relative to
public sector positions. Second, the unemployed can look for jobs outside
their place of residence so the locus of wage push does not necessarily
coincide with the locus of joblessness. The pressure on wages can vary at a
given unemployment rate depending on the balance of inward and outward
commuting.
(i) The public-private wage gap. Because of national pay scales the wage
effect of regional unemployment is weaker in the public sector, therefore
the private/public wage gap varies across regions. Without trying to address
the issue in detail (see Kézdi 1998) we would provide data suggesting that
the wage advantage of the corporate sector increased substantially in
regions where the rate of registered unemployment remained low during
the transition.22
Fig. 5.
The ratio of mean earnings in the corporate sector to mean earnings
in the public sector in low- and high-unemployment regions
Female workers aged 25-45 with secondary school background
Calculated from the Wage Survey
Given that the compositional differences between the two sectors are
substantial we choose female workers with a secondary school background,
aged 25/45  for the sake of cross-sector comparison. The jobs offered to
this category in the two sectors are fairly similar and usually require little
firm-specific knowledge. We only have a few thousand observations per
year per sector so the regional comparison made in Fig. 5. only
distinguishes between low- and high-unemployment districts classified on
the basis of registered unemployment rates in 1996.
The private/public wage gap remained tight in the high-unemployment
regions until 1995-96 when a program of fiscal austerity, named after the
minister of finance as the ‘Bokros package’, widened it to 20 %. In the
low-unemployment regions where restructuring was faster, and the
corporate sector more viable, the gap was widening almost continuously
and the wage advantage of the private sector grew to almost 40 % by 1996.
A wider wage gap may direct the job seekers towards business enterprises,
increase the competition for jobs in the corporate sector and, by doing so,
imply stronger unemployment-related wage push (at a given rate of registry
unemployment) in the more successful regions.23
(ii) Commuting. A general shortcoming of regional unemployment statistics
is that they compare the number of  job seekers living in a region to the
number of employed and unemployed persons living there. The registers
and surveys fail to account for the fact that persons living in town  i can
search for a job in town j and when they do so they exert influence on the
wages in j. We take into account this problem in a rough-and-ready way
relying on the observation that spatial mobility has the strongest effect on
the labour markets of small and medium-sized towns.  The two charts of
Fig. 6. provide support in the case of Hungary.
11
The left panel shows the ratio of non-resident employees to resident
employees in the 19 county capitals using data from the 1990 Census. The
highest ratios are observed in small cities and – had we omitted Miskolc,
the outlier second from the right – we could also say that the smaller the
city the higher the ratio. This rule would apply to Budapest with a mere
20% share of commuters. (Not shown). The second panel illustrates the
exposure of a town’s labour market to non-resident job seekers calculated
with the formula:
Ej = ￿k˛K POPkj / POPj
where K is the set of villages and towns (within 40 km) having public
transport connection to town j and having a higher unemployment rate than
that of j.  The data relate to 1993.
12 The E ratio wants to measure the size of
the population for which town j provides an accessible and relatively good
market for job hunting.
                                                
11 The reason why this pattern may generally hold is easy to understand in the clear case
when villages of equal size are spotted evenly in the geographical space, and the travel
to work areas are limited by distance. In this case the rural population has roughly the
same size in each TWA and the smaller the center the larger the TWA’s population in
relative terms. In practice bigger cities have larger TWAs, of course, but not
proportionally larger.
12 Village or town k is connected with town j if it is possible to arrive at j from k by
means of train or coach (operated by a Volán company) between 5.30 and 7.30. a.m.
For details see Köllõ (1997)  The chart shows the location of the 169 labour office
centers („towns”). Budapest was excluded.24
Fig. 6.
Settlement size and inward commuting
Commuters/local employees                            Exposure to non-resident job
and the size of county capitals                            seekers and settlement size
         (1990 Census)                                                (E ratio, see the text)
The chart suggests the highest levels of exposure to external job seekers in
medium-sized towns. Many of the smaller ones have depressed labour
markets providing no better opportunities for job seekers than they have at
their place of living. In the larger centers the number of external job
seekers, constrained by distance, remains low in  relative terms simply
because the city itself is large. Insofar as we trust in these data we can
conclude that the number of  non-resident job seekers can be particularly
high in smaller towns. The wage push exerted by them appears as a
‘settlement size-specific’ wage disadvantage on the part of smaller towns in
models like (10). Had we measured the number of job seekers properly we
would have observed smaller region-specific wage differentials between
large and small cities and larger ones between urban areas (as a whole) and
villages.
* * *
Taken together, sections 4.1.–4.3. suggested that a large part of what
appeared ‘region-specific’ in our standard earnings regressions could be
traced back to regional differences in search intensity or other mechanisms
governing the actual competition for jobs in the business sector. The fact
that we found these ‘competitive pressures’ relatively strong in the well-
performing districts is not accidental in our opinion and raises doubts over25
wage flexibility as a cure to high regional unemployment. Before
discussing these doubts in more detail it may be useful to observe, as far as
the ‘time series’ at hand permit, the development paths of regions
following the transition shock.
5. CAN WE OBSERVE CONVERGENCE (UNTIL 1996)?
Even in the US where regional shocks are less persistent than in Europe a
typical district needs about five years to recover, mostly by virtue of
outward migration, as shown in Blanchard and Katz 1992. Despite of the
fact that the time elapsed since the transition shock is short, and the
available evidence scarce, we try to summarize some basic statistics on the
possible returns to flexible wage adjustment. First we look at
unemployment persistence with the aid of Fig. 7.
 Fig. 7
Registered unemployment rate differentials (170 regions)
Registered unemployment rates
170 regions by unemployment
in 1993 and 1996
Measures of dispersion
max/min , d10/d1 ,  q4/q1
The left panel shows the location of regions by registered unemployment in
1993 and 1996. The rates declined almost everywhere and fell more in
absolute terms in high-unemployment districts. However, as shown by the
right panel, the standard measures of inequality (maximum/minimum,
top/bottom deciles and quartiles) indicate growing differences in relative
terms. The max/min ratio increased in 1996, the interdecile range was26
widening in 1995-96 and the quartile ratio had been growing since 1993. 
13
A high degree of persistence is also shown by a Spearman’s correlation
coefficient of  0.85 for rankings in 1993 and 1996 – a very high value if we
consider that the rankings are exposed to random changes to a large extent
because of the small size of the labour office districts. (The average district
inhabits only 50,000 people).
Second, we look at indicators of the demand side of the labour market in
regions hit differently by the transition shock. (Table 4). The 170 micro-
regions are ranked by their unemployment rates in 1993. Q2. and grouped
into quintiles with q1 denoting the  best 1/5 of regions. We follow the
quintile groups over time in 1993-96 (or 1995 as the data permit).
The first indicator is  physical capital formation measured with the
proportion of firms installing new equipment or opening new facilities. The
results indicate statistically insignificant differences between good and bad
districts in 1993-95. In 1996 the records of the ‘worst’ 1/5 of regions seem
better than the average. Pearson’s chi-square for the crosstabulation of the
5 region groups and the 2 outcomes
14 provides a value of 9.8 significant at
the 0.044 level. A 2x2 table where q5 is distinguished from all other
regions yields a chi-square of 4.83 significant at the 0.028 level. Thus, we
cannot reject the hypothesis that the proportion of firms expanding their
capacities was higher in the hardest-hit 1/5 of regions than elsewhere, in
1996.
15 Unfortunately we lack information on the employment effect of
these investments.
Second, firm creation is considered as an indicator of economic vitality. In
this respect the gap was spectacularly widening between the regions, at
least until data were available (1995). The gap between q1 and q5 became
wider in both absolute and relative terms. (The former is easy to check
from the table. In relative terms firm density grew by 90% in q1 and 77%
in q5 between 1992 and 1995.) The net change in  sole-proprietorships
depicts a similar path: the growth in absolute terms was slower in the hard-
hit regions in all years. (In relative terms the number of entrepreneurs
increased by 34% in q1 and 28% in q5 in 1992–1995).
                                                
13 Yet unpublished calculations by Károly Fazekas suggest that regional dispersion
grew further in 1997-98.
14 Existence/lack of investment.
15 It might be added that by regressing the physical capital formation dummy on
unemployment (using 170 observations on the latter) we get positive coefficients in
both logit and probit models but only at a significance level of 0.14. Entering a linear
and a squared term simultaneously yields insignificant parameters.27
Table 4
Success indicators in five groups of regions 1993–96
Physical capital formation
The proportion of firms installing new equipment or building within
6 months following the survey date (per cent of all interviewed firms)
       Quintiles of regions by level of unemployment in 1993. Q2.
q1
lowest
q2 q3 q4 q5
highest
1993 17.6 17.6 18.4 19.9 17.2
1994 24.0 20.4 21.2 21.2 21.1
1995 23.4 23.0 22.8 23.8 23.5
1996 24.4 21.4 25.2 23.2 27.6
Source: NLC Labour Market Forecast Survey (second waves).
Nobs: 4178, 4517, 4478 and 4449 firms, respectively
Firm creation (net)    




q2 q3 q4 q5
highest
1993 6.3 3.3 2.8 2.1 1.5
1994 6.6 3.1 2.2 1.7 0.9
1995 2.3 2.4 1.7 1.5 1.0
Source: TSTAR database of the Central Statistical Office.
Business start-ups (net)    
Annual change in the number of sole-proprietorships per 1000 inhabitants
q1
lowest
q2 q3 q4 q5
highest
1993 9.1 8.5 8.2 6.5 5.4
1994 13.1 8.2 7.2 5.3 3.0
1995 2.7 1.3 0.5 0.8 0.6
Source: TSTAR database, Central Statistical Office.
Foreign firms
Workers employed in majority foreign-owned firms (per cent)
q1
lowest
q2 q3 q4 q5
highest
1993 13.1 8.5 6.5 5.7 4.8
1994 15.5 9.8 8.3 6.1 5.8
1995 20.8 13.2 11.1 9.1 8.8
1996 22.3 16.8 14.3 14.9 11.7
Source: Wage Survey28
Finally, a proxy of foreign direct investment is summarized. It seems that
q3 and q4 were able to keep pace with q1 and q2 in terms of foreign-firm
density but the disadvantage of the hardest-hit 1/5 of regions apparently
increased. It must be added that we use the share of foreign-firm employees
in total employment as a success indicator. The ratio of foreign employees
to the labour force (or to the population) would certainly indicate
divergence.
Though, as was emphasized earlier, it may be too early to expect
spectacular change in regional disparities, observing no change or
divergence in important respects certainly deepens the doubts whether
wage adjustment could efficiently help the depressed regions. A higher
proportion of firms installing new equipment in 1996 is the only potentially
promising development we could register in the hard-hit areas – some six
years after the transition shock.
6. LESSONS FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY
Economists advocate wage flexibility in the conviction that it constitutes
the core of an equilibrating mechanism which, on the long run, prevents the
depressed regions from final collapse. Leaving aside the severe side effects
(Freeman 1995), the problem of the time needed for a ‘wage-led’ recovery,
efficiency wage considerations and other debated issues we would like to
emphasize some inherently paradox effects exerted by wage flexibility on
regional evolution.
(i) First, the effect of wage flexibility is controversial because its impact on
job search. Regions unequally affected by a general economic shock reach
very different unemployment rates within a short time. Right after jobloss
workers usually look for employment actively, so the difference between
registered and search unemployment will be small in all regions. If wages
are flexible they fall in region B, hit by a severe shock, relative to the more
fortunate region A. The returns to job search then deteriorate in B because
of lower wages, less jobs per job seeker, and the erosion of human capital
under the long periods workers must spend out of work. In region A these
affects are weaker. As a result, the differences in search unemployment and
hence wage push are diminishing and – if wages are flexible – the wage
gap between A and B starts to narrow. B’s labor cost relative to A follows a
U-shaped path. The degree of wage flexibility affects the curvature of this29
path implying faster wage decline in B during the crisis but a faster wage
decline in A when the crisis is over and wages react to changes in the
volume of search.
The relevance of this mechanism depends on the responsiveness of
unemployed workers to expected utility from job search, on the one hand,
and on the responsiveness of factor mobility to spatial variations in labour
costs, on the other. In Europe where large movements in and out of the
labour force occur in response to changes in regional fortunes (Decressin
and Fatás 1995, Jimeno and Bentolila 1998) but migration and relocation
are less intense than in the US it certainly bears some relevance.
(ii) Second, wage flexibility reduces the demand for consumer goods and
services and restricts the scope for small business development. Lower firm
density reduces the spillover effects generating external increasing returns,
and probably weakens the ‘demonstration effect’ low-wage SMEs can have
on wage bargaining at larger firms.
(iii) Third, wage flexibility tends to depreciate the value of being employed
in an enterprise (relative to working in the public sector) and thus averts the
job seekers from the sector where wages could respond to high
unemployment.
In the particular case of Hungary we could observe several indications of
the above-mentioned paradoxical effects. It would be strong to say that
they all tightened the cost gap between the hard-hit and the more fortunate
regions because all of them had special context. The statistics on job search
indicated large differences between ‘metropolitan’ and small-town or rural
labour markets. Agglomeration economies favoured the primate
agglomeration vis-à-vis the peripheries. Commuting predictably leads to
increased wage push in relatively small towns as opposed to villages or
large cities. Still, the tendency is clear in that these factors, taken together,
improved the cost competitiveness of centrally located urban areas touched
by a minor ‘transformational recession’ versus the peripheral rural areas hit
by a severe shock.
Simulations using data from  Figs. 2  and 3 can show how large are the
magnitudes. A village in a high-unemployment area (q4) had a cost
advantage of 23 % vis-à-vis Budapest in 1993 of which we attributed 10 %
to the wage pressure of higher unemployment (see q4 and q1 on Fig. 3.)
while 13 % was due to other factors. By 1996 the wage gap associated with30
registered unemployment widened to 15 % while the residual differential
came down to zero. The total difference in labour cost thus fell from 23 %
to 15 %. Since an employer is interested in the gain he/she can make by
moving from one location to another – not in the unemployment-related
component of the gain – the implications of these changes for factor
mobility are by no means promising.
What are the messages for policy? While it is true that wages in Hungary
are flexible by Western standards it hardly discredits the attempts to step
further. The predominance of decentralized wage bargaining averts some
kinds of rigidities, characteristic of corporatism or excessive government
intervention, but other risks are present. Incumbent workers bargaining
with their employer may be less prone to accept lower wages if
unemployment is high than a union organized on occupational or regional
level. The coexistence of free-market practices in the competitive sector
and centralized bargaining in the public sector (national pay scales) makes
the adjustment of regional wages more difficult. Some ‘active’ labour
market programs isolating the long-term unemployed from the labour
market (like communal public works in many cases) also hinder the
adjustment of wages. Increasing the ‘sensibility’ of incumbents to
unemployment (or non-employment rather); taking actions to maximize the
volume of search on the labour market; reforming wage policies in the
public sector are reasonable directions for economic policy, in our opinion.
The choice of economic actors facing the given wages, transactions costs
and externalities widen or, at best, maintain the substantial regional
differences evolved during the transition. This refers to foreign investors
choosing location; people deciding on business start-up; families pondering
over change of residence; or workers comparing the costs and benefits of
continued job search versus inactivity. In order to  diminish regional
disparities the non-wage costs in question should change first of all. We
briefly discuss two policy areas where some realistic goals might be
achieved.
Spatial mobility. The almost full privatization of the rental housing stock
for tenants combined with the tradition of low spatial mobility warns that
the pecuniary cost of migration, and the subjective disutility associated
with moving, will remain rather high in the foreseeable future. In search of
solution mortgage financing has been advocated by many experts and was
actually started by some banks. Others believe that it is easier to promote
mobility among young people who can move without mortgaging property,31
that is, by building student dormitories, opening the secondary schools for
non-residents, offering temporary assistant positions or training for young
people from depressed areas.
Regional mobility might also gain from a better transport system but its
impact on spatial ‘cohesion’ is dubious in principle and unknown in
practice, as yet. It is too early to evaluate the impact on trade and
investment of the few motorways leading to the backward parts of
Hungary. A point where the uncertainty is not so severe is the case of
public transport policies. In the long-lasting period ahead of us when the
cost of private transport will exceed the cost of public transport (for the
average wage earner) raising the fares seems to be a better policy than
cutting the services, at least from the point of view of regional cohesion,
because the latter reduces the net benefit from employment drastically in
villages. It should be added that the potential gain from commuter-friendly
policies is larger in well-performing macro-regions so they can actually
widen the east-west and central-peripheral disparities within the country.
Education. While the correlation between a region’s educational level and
its unemployment rate, business density, FDI inflows, incomes or taxes
appears to be strong this relationship should be interpreted with care. There
are clear cases, especially in single-firm settlements and mono-industry
enclaves, where a coordinated action for reforming the local educational
system could provide high returns by diversifying the supply of skills. The
‘bad equilibrium’ that we observe so frequently in remote villages (high
rates of unemployment and miserable wages on the labour market,
absenteeism, high drop-out rates and low quality of teaching in the schools)
seems much harder to change. Attempts to ‘raise the level of education’
predictably fail if the prospects of employment do not improve in parallel.
The integrated projects addressing several aspects of such a wrong
equilibrium simultaneously are protracted by the strong verticality of the
governmental structure surviving from the state socialist past. The
adaptation of the highly diversified institutional framework of European
local development policies could forward the development of crisis areas.32
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APPENDIX
The Wage Survey: Sample and variables
The National Labour Centre’s Wage Survey covers a representative sample
of firms and 10% random samples of their workers. The survey excludes
small firms (20 or less employees in 1986-94, 10 or less employees in
1995-96). In this paper the analysis is restricted to workers in the business
sector by choice. Banks and insurance companies are also excluded
(because their firm-level indicators like productivity or capital-labour ratio
are not comparable to those of other sectors.)
The cases are weighted to ensure representativity. An individual weight
(w1) stands for the number of workers represented by a respondent given
the sampling quota within his/her firm. The original survey did not contain
information on firm-level non-response. Comparing the target population
and the sample  by firm size and two-digit industry weights (w2) were
attached to firms as well. The final weights (w1￿w2) restore representativity
under the assumption that non-response is uncorrelated with variables in
the calculations.
Notes on the variables. Experience: potential experience (age-schoolyears-
6).  Education: highest completed educational grade.  Job grade: drawn
from the 4-digit FEOR code. Industry: Classification based on observed
flows between the old (pre-1993) and new industrial codes. The procedure
followed and an accounting of mistakes presented in Kertesi and Köllõ
(1997). Location: refers to the settlement where the worker is employed.
Central: Pest, Fejér and Komárom counties. N-West: Gyõr-Sopron, Vas,
Veszprém, Zala. S-West: Baranya, Somogy, Tolna. S-East: Bács-Kiskun,
Csongrád, Békés, Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok. N-East: Hajdú, Szabolcs-
Szatmár-Bereg, Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén, Heves, Nógrád. Unemployment:
log of the registered rate measured at the level of 170 labour office
districts.  Capital-labour ratio:  net value of fixed assets per employee.
Productivity: sales net of consumer tax, price subsidies and material cost,
per employees. Dummy for negative value added.  Ownership: Majority
owner, based on shares in subscribed capital.36
Table A1
Wage equations (Wage Survey, OLS)
Dependent: log gross monthly earnings in May + 1/12 of previous year’s bonuses*








































































































































































































































































































































































aR2 .4523 .4619 .5200 .5039 .5325 .5201 .5432
RMSE .2755 .3273 .3546 .3671 .3849 .3819 .3889
Nobs 116,306 110,888 88,813 87,151 96,282 91,510 92,099
* 27 industry dummies added. References are female, primary school, manual, towns other
than county capitals, South-East, 301–1000 employees, state ownership38
Fig. A1
The parameters of industry dummies in 1986-96 (Reference: engineering)






7) Transport and telecommunication42
8) Energy and public utilities43
 Table A2






Educ.. lnK/L ln(L) ln(y) ln(u) Const aR
2
Managers 9.66 2.38 9.38 2.88 5.82 22.6 -8.74 8.58 0.412
(11,336) -1.67
















3.94 2.06 5.23 19.73 -9.99 9.02 0.389





































0.74 1.66 2.51 13.31 -9.28 9.43 0.249
Estimated from the Wage Survey. Unmarked coefficients are significant at the 0.01 level. n:
not significant. The parameters, except the constants, were multiplied by 100 (10
4
 in the case
of experience squared). The coefficients of the settlement dummies (Budapest, county
capitals, towns, villages) are not displayed.
ln(K/L): Capital/labour ratio, ln(L): firm size, ln(y): productivity, ln(u): unemployment
The detailed name of the occupations (two-digit FEOR  code):: Managers (13): Managers of
firms, factories and departments. Technicians (31): Technicians, dispatchers, programmers
and other technical occupations. Administrators (36): Employees in charge of business
administration, finance, planning, trade, business-related communication and human resource
management. Office workers (41): Accountants, secretaries and other office clerks. Light
industrial workers (73): Spinners, weavers, dressmakers, tanners, shoemakers, printers, etc.
Metal workers (74): Metal workers, foundry workers, fitters, turners, locksmiths,
mechanics. Machine operators (81): Operators of manufacturing equipment, assembly
workers.  Construction workers (74).  Bricklayers, masons, carpenters, plasterers, etc.
Drivers (83): Operators of all kinds of mobile machines. Unskilled workers (91): Unskilled
manual workers, porters, cleaners, guards.